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[Fwd: BATTALION 316]


Ester Garcia wrote:

> Fecha:  1998.09.26
> Fuente: Susan Peacock,  Research Fellow, The National Security Archive, 11 pp.
> Titulo: BATTALION 316, DECLASSIFICATION AND THE STRUGGLE TO END MILITARY
> IMPUNITY IN HONDURAS
> Sumario:        Paper presented at the 1998 meeting of the Latin American Studies
> Association (LASA) Chicago, Illinois.
>
>         For many, in Honduras and around the world, the atrocities committed by
> Battalion 316 in the 1980s against ordinary citizens epitomize the dire
> consequences of military impunity.  Battalion 316 was a Honduran military
> unit specializing in counterintelligence.  The Battalion, which counted
> surveillance, kidnapping, torture and extrajudicial executions among its
> tactics, closely resembled a state-run death squad.  Almost 200 people
> "disappeared' in Honduras in the 1980s, among them students, labor and
> popular-movement leaders, journalists and progressive religious figures.
>
>         This paper examines the Honduran government's investigation of Battalion
> 316's role in human rights abuses as part of a larger effort to end military
> impunity.  It highlights one particular aspect of the Commissioner's
> investigation -- the critical effort to gain access to formerly secret,
> "declassified" documents about the Battalion from the U.S. government.
> Finally, it analyzes the content of those documents which have been
> declassified to date, and identifies inconsistencies in the information
> received.
>
> A POST-COLD WAR FIGHT AGAINST MILITARY IMPUNITY
>
>         Throughout the decade of the eighties, in the heat of the cold war and at
> U.S. urging, the Honduran government adhered to the so-called "national
> security doctrine."  Under this doctrine, the Honduran Armed Forces focused
> their attention not on external threats, but on potential internal
> subversion.  The military controlled all aspects of Honduras' internal
> security, including command of the national police force. Priority was given
> to rooting out dissent -- often without regard for the human rights of
> individuals targeted as potential subversives.  Battalion 316 spearheaded
> the armed forces' offensive against suspected subversives.
>
>         In recent years, with the end of the cold war and armed conflicts in
> Central America, civilian government officials in Honduras have taken steps
> to demilitarize their country.  One of the main fronts in their uphill
> battle is an unprecedented attempt to prosecute military officers for past
> human rights abuses in order to end impunity.  With testimony from
> eyewitnesses, torture survivors and former members of Battalion 316, and the
> exhumation of clandestine burial sites, evidence is accumulating which can
> be used to identify and charge rights violators.
>
>         Key to this effort is an on-going, multifaceted investigation of forced
> disappearances which was launched by Dr. Leo Valladares Lanza in 1992,
> immediately upon his appointment as Honduras' first National Commissioner
> for Human Rights ("Ombudsman").  Honduran law specifically charges the Human
> Rights Commissioner with the investigation of violations committed by
> Honduran authorities, including the military and police.  The law further
> stipulates that the investigations undertaken are independent of the
> executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.  Honduran
> government officials and entities must give the Human Rights Commissioner
> information requested in the course of an investigation.  Since the
> Commissioner does not have prosecutorial power, in cases where there is
> evidence of criminal wrongdoing, findings are passed along to Honduras'
> Attorney General, who in turn
> brings formal charges against alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses.
>
>         In December 1993, Human Rights Commissioner Valladares released a detailed
> "preliminary" report on the findings of his investigation.  The report,
> entitled The Facts Speak for Themselves, documented the role of the Honduran
> Armed Forces -- and particularly Battalion 316 -- in 184 disappearances
> during the 1980s.  It represented
> the first official acknowledgment by the Honduran government of military
> participation in the disappearance of its own citizens.
>
> DECLASSIFICATION REQUESTS
>
>         From the very beginning of his investigation, Valladares' efforts to
> recover relevant Honduran documents related to cases of disappearance bore
> little fruit.  Like most other Latin American nations, Honduras has no clear
> laws to preserve State archives.  Neither is there an established legal
> process for public disclosure of Honduran government records.  Valladares
> quickly discovered that key Honduran files were missing or had been
> destroyed.  For example, during an on-site inspection at the offices of
> Honduran military intelligence, human rights investigators found only empty
> file cabinets and were told that files are routinely burned every five years
> in order to free up additional storage space.
>
>         In light of this situation, Valladares turned to the United States, which
> has the most sophisticated archival and freedom of information system in the
> world, to uncover historical documentation regarding human rights violations
> in Honduras.  Given the close collaboration between the U.S. government and
> the Honduran military during the 1980s, Valladares reasonably assumed that
> U.S. files contain human rights information critical to his investigation.
>
>         On November 15, 1993, Valladares presented his first formal
> declassification request to the U.S. government.  The U.S. Administration
> expressed a willingness to cooperate and to provide assistance, but
> indicated that the request was too broad in scope.1 Twice Valladares
> narrowed his response, submitting an abridged final version to the U.S.
> Ambassador in Honduras on August 1, 1995.2
>
>         Battalion 316 is one of only three subject areas included in the final
> declassification request from the Honduran Human Rights Commissioner.  The
> request intentionally targets information on Battalion 316 relevant to the
> investigation of disappearances.  It reads, in part:
>
> We are requesting finished intelligence, reports, studies, notes, papers,
> cables, memoranda, briefing papers, talking points, meeting minutes,
> biographical material and any and all other documents generated by the
> United States Government agencies between 1979 through and including 1984,
> about the Battalion 316, a unit of Military Intelligence established to
> monitor and destroy 'subversive' organizations and individuals in Honduras.3
>
>         The petition requests "any and all records" related to Battalion 316 in
> three specific areas.  The first focuses on "the origins, structure,
> planning operations, training, and members" of Battalion 316 and its
> institutional precursors.  The second seeks "records which mention the
> Battalion 316 and/or its predecessors" in reference to six cases of
> disappearance.  The third pursues records on nineteen "individuals who were
> members of the Battalion 316, of its
> precursors, or of other special anti-subversive units of the Armed Forces or
> of the police."4
>
>         Seven U.S. government agencies were asked to provide information on
> Battalion 316.  They are: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
> Department of Defense (DOD), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the U.S.
> Army, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Department of State (DOS).5
>
>         Almost five years have passed since the United States received the initial
> Honduran Human Rights Commissioner's request for human rights information.
> Despite repeated assurances that the request would be expedited, the U.S.
> government's response has been excruciatingly slow.6
>
>         The CIA has yet to release records on Battalion 316 to the Honduran
> government.  The delay is particularly aggravating given the fact that the
> agency's Inspector General (IG) issued a classified report on the CIA's
> relationship to the Honduran military on August 27, 1997.  The report was
> submitted to the House and Senate Intelligence
> Committees, but Honduran investigators are not privy to its contents.
>
>         It is noteworthy that upon review of its contents, on October 29, 1997, the
> Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
> (SSCI) sent a letter to Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet
> asking that the CIA IG report be declassified to the maximum extent
> possible.  The letter further requests that DCI Tenet report back to the
> Committee within four week on his intentions regarding the declassification
> of the IG report as well as to his response to the recommendations in the
> report.7  The SSCI leaders have not yet received a response from Tenet.
>
>         The information declassified by other U.S. agencies on Battalion 316 has
> been scant and inadequate. This is particularly true in the case of the
> Defense Department which claims to have processed and turned over all its
> records which are responsive to the Honduran request.  The DOD has released
> a total of 49 documents to the Honduran
> authorities; thirteen of these mention Battalion 316.  The Battalion
> 316-related documents are either heavily redacted, or are transcriptions
> which expurgate everything but the text which was released. 8
>
>         The bulk of the U.S. information related to Battalion 316 which the
> Honduran authorities have received was previously declassified in response
> to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request from The Baltimore Sun.  The 26
> May 1994 request included:
>
> Any and all information related to the origin, structure, members and
> functions of Battalion 316; and all information relating to assistance and
> training provided by the United States government and others to members of
> Battalion 316, and any all (sic) information relating to possible human
> rights violations committed by members of Battalion 316.9
>
>         After the FOI request languished for almost a year without a response, The
> Sun grew impatient.  It hired a prominent law firm and threatened to sue the
> CIA to obtain documents.  The very next day a packet of fourteen
> declassified documents was delivered to the newspaper's offices.10
>         Most of the information obtained by The Sun involves the testimony of
> Florencio Caballero Bonilla.  Caballero, a former Honduran Army Sergeant,
> claimed to have been a member of Battalion 316 who had received training in
> interrogation techniques from the CIA.  He deserted from the Honduran
> military intelligence apparatus in June, 1986 and later shared eyewitness
> testimony in a number of different fora, some public and some confidential.
> Since Caballero's testimony first became public, the U.S. has downplayed it
> and has questioned its accuracy.
>
>         Honduran investigators used the content of the declassified U.S. documents
> to help formulate questions which were posed to Caballero in Toronto, Canada
> in November, 1996.  The sworn deposition taken there was the last testimony
> given by Caballero prior to his death in July, 1997.  This testimony will
> remain sealed until introduced as evidence in Honduran court.
>
> BATTALION 316'S EXISTENCE AND STRUCTURE
>
>         A U.S. Defense Department paper on "Honduran Intelligence Organization (U)"
> indicates that the 316th Military Intelligence Battalion (MIB) was formed in
> January 1983 as part of the restructuring of the intelligence system.
> It reports that:
>
> The MIB, in support of national intelligence requirements, has established
> covert operational sites in major cities and is working closely with DNI
> [National Directorate of Investigations] and its network of agents and
> informants.  In addition, the MIB works closely with the Signal Battalion
> and the PSYOPS GP [Psychological Operations Group], while providing direct
> support to the Special Forces Battalion and FUSEP's elite counterterrorist
> unit, the Special
> Squadron or Cobras.11
>
>         Battalion 316's organization into four companies -- Support, Military
> Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Internal Security, and a Special
> Operations Squadron (Support) -- is described in some detail.  The paper
> notes that:
>
> The Counterintelligence (CI) Company is the most developed part of the MIB
> and apparently enjoys the highest priority.  The CI Company is not large,
> probably less than 50 members.  The majority of the personnel working in or
> with the CI Company are DNI agents, [excised].  The primary mission of the
> CI Company is to develop intelligence, through covert means, concerning
> subversive and antigovernment groups, factions, or individuals who might
> pose a threat.12
>
> Honduran human rights investigators have focused their attention on the CI
> Company.
>
>         The January 1983 date for the establishment of Battalion 316 which appears
> in the DOD paper is inaccurate.  The Human Rights Commissioner has obtained
> a copy of National Defense and Public Security Ministry Accords 0112 and
> 0113 in which the Armed Forces Commander Gustavo Alvarez Martinez ordered
> the creation of Intelligence Battalion 316, and assigned personnel to staff
> it.13  Both Accords are dated January 2, 1984.
>
>         Regarding the disbanding of Battalion 316, one sentence of an unidentified
> DOD document was released which reads, "Press reports of January 1988
> indicate that the 316th Battalion was deactivated in September 1987 to quell
> speculation following allegations of death squad activities made against the
> battalion."14 This is consistent with the testimony given by Colonel Roberto
> Nunez chief of Honduran military intelligence, before the Inter-American Court
> of Human Rights in 1998.
>
> 316 AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
>
>         What do declassified U.S. documents say about Battalion 316's
> responsibility for human rights abuses?
>
>         In response to the requests for the declassification of human rights
> information, the CIA formed an internal "Honduras Working Group."  The
> public had its first glimpse of the Group's findings in August 1997 when the
> CIA released seven pages of its redacted 37 page report.  Though the date of
> the report is excised, the text reveals that it was written sometime after
> May 1997.  One can therefore assume that the report represents a relatively
> current assessment by the CIA of the information retrieved from its files.
>
>         The released portions of the report contain disappointingly little human
> rights information about Battalion 316.  In fact, the Working Group
> concluded that:
>
> ... there is little information in the files to corroborate press reports
> that the 316th Battalion was a death squad or was involved in many abuses.
> Information in the files implicates the 316th Battalion in only one case --
> that of the disappearance of leftists Morales and Vindel in 1984.15
>
> Gustavo Morales and Rolando Vindel are identified as "two senior Honduran
> Communist Party members" who were abducted on 18 March 1984.  Honduran
> authorities denied having the men in custody, "but [excised] had reporting
> to the contrary."16
>
>         The report reveals that the CIA received fairly detailed information on
> this case from its sources.  One section includes disturbing accounts that:
>
> "...the 316th Battalion was holding Morales and Vindel as late as 15 April",
> at least a month after they were originally captured;
>
> "... Vindel was seriously wounded, his leg broken by gunshot as he tried to
> flee during the abduction"; and
>
> "...[excised] had withheld food from the two men for at least the first
> eight days of their captivity."17
>
>         The report's authors exercise care in the attribution of organizational
> responsibility in this case.  A footnote of the report clarifies that even
> though CIA sources referred to Morales and Vindel's abductors as members of
> a Special Unit of the Public Security Forces (Fuerzas de Seguridad Publica -
> FUSEP):
>
> Our review, however, indicates that by January 1984 the FUSEP Special Unit
> had been incorporated into the 316th Battalion.  It seems clear that
> [excised] continued to call the group by its former rather than its new
> name.  This review, however, has used the title 316th Battalion where
> appropriate to depict organizational responsibility accurately.18
>
> ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BLURRED
>
>         By focusing on 'organizational responsibility', the CIA Honduras Working
> Group report exonerates Battalion 316 in all but one case of forced
> disappearance.  Instead, it attributes responsibility for human rights
> abuses to the FUSEP Special Unit and to a rightist paramilitary organization
> called the Honduran Anti-Communist Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion
> Anti-Comunista de Honduras - ELACH).  The report goes on to suggest a link
> between the FUSEP Special
> Unit and ELACH, citing three specific cases:
>
> The source reported that ELACH victims included, among others, Nativi
> Martinez, and Angel Manfredo Velazquez ... Information [excised] in 1981
> indicated that the FUSEP's Special Unit was involved in the killings of
> Nativi, Martinez,
> and Velazquez.19
>
>         ELACH was never identified as a group in Honduras in the 1980s.  Honduran
> investigators are puzzled by the CIA findings regarding its role in abuse.
> Indeed, the first mention investigators heard of ELACH occurred in a Senate
> Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) document which was declassified for
> The Baltimore Sun in early 1995.  This secret 1986 trip report by SSCI staff
> states:
>
> In a recent letter to the SSCI, the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence]
> described human rights abuses in Honduras.  Mr. Casey outlined the
> activities of the National Directorate of Investigations (DNI) and its
> relationship to ELACH, a right-wing death squad.  Between 1980-84, the
> 'symbiotic relationship' between DNI and ELACH resulted in the execution of
> at least nine persons who were Honduran leftists.  Each of these executions
> was personally approved by the Armed Forces Commander and by the President.
> [excised]  Finally, in his letter, the DCI expressed concern that ELACH
> continues to be a viable organization and has high level contacts in the
> government.20
>
>         Some of the content of Casey's letter may have been drawn from a secret CIA
> cable dated 26 November 1985 which reads:
>
> BETWEEN 1980, WHEN THE HONDURAN ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION ARMY ELACH WAS
> FOUNDED, AND 1984, WHEN ELACH KIDNAPPINGS AND EXECUTIONS WERE ENDED, AT
> LEAST NINE HONDURAN LEFTISTS WERE KIDNAPPED AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED BY
> ELACH AT THE ORDER OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF
> INVESTIGATIONS (DNI).  WHEN ELACH CONDUCTED A KIDNAPPING AND KILLING, ITS
> ACTION WAS COORDINATED WITH DNI, AND OCCASIONALLY PERSONNEL FROM ELACH AND
> THE DNI WORKED JOINTLY IN SUCH OPERATIONS.21
>
>         It is notable that this cable includes Tomas Nativi, Fidel Martinez and
> Angel Manfredo Velasquez on the list
> of the nine individuals kidnapped and killed by ELACH, presumably in
> coordination with the DNI.  In contrast to the
> Honduras Working Group report, this cable makes no reference to the FUSEP
> Special Unit's involvement in these
> three cases.
>
>         There is clearly confusion about organizational responsibility.  This may
> be due in part to the fact that at the time DNI, like the Special Unit, was
> under FUSEP command.  A declassified DOD paper indicates that, "DNI was
> organized to be the criminal investigation branch of FUSEP, but expanded its
> operations to cover subversion,
> counterintelligence, and intelligence gathering ."22
>
>         Given the confusion about which entity within FUSEP bore responsibility for
> these three disappearances, the determination of individual responsibility
> becomes paramount to Honduran investigators.  Release of U.S. information on
> individual perpetrators of abuses could be extremely helpful in situations
> like this.
>
>         The issue of organizational responsibility is further complicated by
> references to the connection between Battalion 316 and ELACH.  The SSCI trip
> report notes that:
>
> The 316 MIB reports directly to the Chief of Honduran Intelligence and the
> Commander of the Armed Forces.  The battalion continues to conduct
> surveillance operations against Honduran leftists. [excised] could not
> guarantee that there was no hand-over of information from the battalion to
> ELACH because of the high level contacts ELACH maintains with members of the
> Honduran Armed Forces.23
>
>         Thus, instead of clarifying the issue of organizational responsibility, the
> declassified documents raise further questions.  Different documents suggest
> connections between ELACH and the FUSEP Special Unit, ELACH and the DNI, and
> ELACH and Battalion 316.  Exactly what was the relationship between these
> bodies?  What was the time period during which ELACH was operative?
>
>         The information from U.S. files indicates that three groups -- FUSEP
> Special Unit, DNI and Battalion 316 -- under the command of the Honduran
> Armed Forces coordinated closely with each other and with the paramilitary
> ELACH.  Was this by design?  Blurred lines of organizational responsibility
> may give the Honduran Armed Forces plausible deniability for human rights
> abuses.
>
>         Given this dynamic, it is important that the Honduran declassification
> requests be interpreted as broadly as possible by the U.S. government.  If,
> while processing the pending request for information on Battalion 316, U.S.
> agency officials stumble upon substantive information on human rights abuses
> by other military or paramilitary groups or specific individuals, this too
> should be processed for possible release, even if the group or individual is
> not
> specifically mentioned in the request.  Declassification of human rights
> information is not an academic exercise, but rather an opportunity to assist
> investigators who seek to identify and prosecute violators in order to stop
> impunity and to strengthen democracy in Honduras.
>
> INFORMATION ON ELACH SOUGHT
>
>         Clearly, additional information on ELACH is of critical importance to human
> rights investigators in Honduras.  Since first reading the reference to
> ELACH in the SSCI trip report, the Honduran Human Rights Commissioner and
> others have sought to learn more.  Indeed, his final, narrow
> declassification request to the U.S. government specifically listed key
> documents related to Battalion 316, among them:
>
> A copy of the 1986 letter written by CIA Director William Casey to the
> Senate Select Committee on Intelligence describing human rights in Honduras,
> and discussing connections between the National Directorate of
> Investigations (DNI) and 'ELACH', a right-wing death squad.24
>
> This letter has not yet been declassified.
>
>         Freedom of Information Act requests have also been submitted to the CIA,
> the Defense Department and to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) for any and
> all records concerning ELACH from 1979 to the present.  Only SOUTHCOM has
> responded to date, indicating that it was "unsuccessful in locating any
> information responsive to your request."25
>
>         There is no mention of ELACH in any of the human rights records which the
> U.S. Defense Department (DOD) has released to Honduran authorities.  This is
> illogical and would appear to contradict the CIA Working Group's Findings.
>
>         Battalion 316, the FUSEP Special Unit and the DNI were all under Honduran
> military command during the time period that the most serious human rights
> abuses occurred.  This was also a period when the U.S. military worked
> closely with the Honduran Armed Forces on counter-insurgency and
> anti-subversive programs.  Most of the victims of human rights abuses were
> suspected subversives. Given this historical context and in light of SOUTHCOM's
> particular responsibility to monitor and report on military activities in
> Honduras, why is there no information on ELACH in its files?
>
> CONCLUSIONS
>
>         Honduras is a country in transition from years of military rule to a strong
> democratic state.  It is a country scarred by the emotional wounds of
> egregious human rights violations committed by military and paramilitary
> groups during the 1980s.  Healing and reconciliation will not occur without
> a full airing of this dark history, much of which remains shrouded in secrecy.
>
>         The right to information is a fundamental human right and a pillar of
> democracy, both in Honduras and in the United States.  The right to
> information is not only a major safeguard against military and other
> official impunity, but a fundamental necessity in a society that has
> experienced the type of violence and turmoil that befell Honduras in the 1980s.
>
>         The search for the truth about groups like Battalion 316 that achieved
> notoriety for human rights abuses is a protracted and painful process.  It
> is necessary, nonetheless, to break the cycle of impunity, to reestablish the
> citizenry's trust in the institution of the Honduran state and to foster the
> moral and political health of the nation.
>
>         The United States can contribute to this process by making a sincere,
> concerted effort to locate and expedite public disclosure of human rights
> records on Honduras to the fullest extent possible.  Such a declassification
> of records would send a convincing message that the United States will not
> tolerate military impunity, and stands clearly and unequivocally for
> democracy and human rights in Honduras.
>
> FOOTNOTES
>
> 1 An English translation of the 8 December 1993 letter from then U.S.
> Ambassador William T. Pryce, in response to the Valladares request, is found
> on page 255 of The Facts Speak for Themselves, published by Human Rights
> Watch/Americas and the Center for Justice and International Law in July 1994.
>
> 2 Valladares' second declassification request, dated December 21, 1993,
> included three general points related to Battalion 316 as well as a list of
> 29 U.S. officials to be queried about their knowledge of "the practice of
> kidnapping, torture, disappearances and executions of Honduran and
> Nicaraguan citizens by the Battalion 316."  An English translation of this
> request can be found on pages 242-247 of The Facts Speak for Themselves,
> published by Human Rights Watch/Americas and the Center for Justice and
> International Law in July 1994.
>
> The Special Prosecutor for Human Rights of the Honduran Public Ministry,
> Sonia Marlyna de Flores, submitted a separate declassification request to
> the U.S. government on June 15, 1995.  Battalion 316 is one of the five
> topics included in the Flores request.  An English translation of the Flores
> request is found on pages 84-87 of In Search of Hidden Truths, published by
> the National Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras in January 1998.
>
> 3 In Search of Hidden Truths, by Leo Valladares Lanza and Susan C. Peacock,
> National Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras, January 1998, p. 96.
>
> 4 Ibid, p. 97.
>
> 5 An English translation of the final Valladares request, including the
> specifics addressed to each of the agencies, is found on pages 91-103 of In
> Search of Hidden Truths, published by the National Commissioner for Human
> Rights in Honduras in January 1998.
>
> 6 A 13 June 1997 letter from President Clinton to each of the 51 Members of
> the U.S. Congress who had written him
> about the Honduras declassification stated that, "CIA expects to release any
> human rights-related material on
> General Alvarez by early September and on Battalion 316 by late November."
>
> A 1 December 1997 letter from President Bill Clinton to Morton Halperin,
> Chair, Advisory Board, Center for National Security Studies, indicated that
> the "CIA will release human rights-related material on General Alvarez in
> the next few weeks and on Battalion 316 by year's end.  The latter will
> include the Inspector General's report."
>
> On 11 May 1998, in sworn testimony before the Subcommittee on Government
> Management, Information and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform
> and Oversight of the U.S. House of Representatives, Mr. Lee S. Strickland,
> Chief, Information Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency, projected the
> release of documents on Battalion 316 and portions of the CIA IG report "in
> several weeks."
>
> 7 Though the SSCI letter itself is partially classified, reference is made
> to it in a letter which Senator Carl Levin sent to his constituent, Virginia
> Smith, on October 30, 1997.
>
> 8 On January 30, 1998 the US Defense Department (DOD) turned over fifteen
> documents.  Instead of making them available in their original redacted
> format, DOD transcribed only the text released on plain, white paper, giving
> no indication of its origin or the date on which the material was officially
> declassified.
>
> 9  In Search of Hidden Truths, by Leo Valladares Lanza and Susan C. Peacock,
> National Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras, January 1998, p. 16.
>
> 10 The Sun incorporated this newly declassified information in its
> prize-winning, four-part series of reports on U.S. knowledge of, and
> complicity in, human rights violations in Honduras which was published in
> June 1995.
>
> 11 "Honduran Intelligence Organization (U)", date excised, DOD
> Declassification (3/97), Document 4, p. 2.
>
> 12 Ibid, p. 4.
>
> 13 Los Hechos Hablan Por Si Mismos, Comisionado Nacional de Proteccion de
> los Derechos Humanos, Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras, January
> 1994, pp. 467-469.
>
> 14 "Battalion 36 Reported Deactivated in September 1987", DOD
> Declassification (1/98).
>
> 15 Review and Findings of the Honduras Working Group, date excised, CIA
> Honduras Declassification (8/97), Document H2-94, page 9.
>
> 16 Ibid, page 9.
>
> 17 Ibid, page 35.
>
> 18 Ibid, page 35.
>
> 19 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
>
> 20 "Trip to Honduras", 18 March 1986, Secret Memorandum, The Baltimore Sun
> Declassification, pp. 6-7.
>
> 21 "1. HONDURAN LEFTISTS EXECUTED BY THE HONDURAN ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION
> ARMY BETWEEN 1980-1984; 2. HONDURAN LEFTISTS PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY
> "ELACH" IN 1985", 26 November 1985, CIA Declassification (8/97), Document
> H2-20, p. 2.
>
> 22 "Honduran Intelligence Organization (U)", date excised, DOD
> Declassification (3/97), Document 4, p. 4.
>
> 23 "Trip to Honduras", 18 March 1986, Secret Memorandum, The Baltimore Sun
> Declassification, p. 7.
>
> 24 Request for Documents Made by the National Commissioner for Human Rights
> in Honduras to the Government of the United States, original Spanish
> version, July 31, 1995, page 6.
>
> 25 Letter from Lt. A. A. Hipolito to author, U.S. Southern Command, FOIA REF
> #98-085, 10 August 1998, one page.
--- Begin Message --- 
Fecha:	1998.09.26
Fuente:	Susan Peacock,  Research Fellow, The National Security Archive, 11 pp.
Titulo:	BATTALION 316, DECLASSIFICATION AND THE STRUGGLE TO END MILITARY
IMPUNITY IN HONDURAS
Sumario:	Paper presented at the 1998 meeting of the Latin American Studies
Association (LASA) Chicago, Illinois.

	For many, in Honduras and around the world, the atrocities committed by
Battalion 316 in the 1980s against ordinary citizens epitomize the dire
consequences of military impunity.  Battalion 316 was a Honduran military
unit specializing in counterintelligence.  The Battalion, which counted
surveillance, kidnapping, torture and extrajudicial executions among its
tactics, closely resembled a state-run death squad.  Almost 200 people
"disappeared' in Honduras in the 1980s, among them students, labor and
popular-movement leaders, journalists and progressive religious figures.

	This paper examines the Honduran government's investigation of Battalion
316's role in human rights abuses as part of a larger effort to end military
impunity.  It highlights one particular aspect of the Commissioner's
investigation -- the critical effort to gain access to formerly secret,
"declassified" documents about the Battalion from the U.S. government.
Finally, it analyzes the content of those documents which have been
declassified to date, and identifies inconsistencies in the information
received.

A POST-COLD WAR FIGHT AGAINST MILITARY IMPUNITY
  
	Throughout the decade of the eighties, in the heat of the cold war and at
U.S. urging, the Honduran government adhered to the so-called "national
security doctrine."  Under this doctrine, the Honduran Armed Forces focused
their attention not on external threats, but on potential internal
subversion.  The military controlled all aspects of Honduras' internal
security, including command of the national police force. Priority was given
to rooting out dissent -- often without regard for the human rights of
individuals targeted as potential subversives.  Battalion 316 spearheaded
the armed forces' offensive against suspected subversives.

	In recent years, with the end of the cold war and armed conflicts in
Central America, civilian government officials in Honduras have taken steps
to demilitarize their country.  One of the main fronts in their uphill
battle is an unprecedented attempt to prosecute military officers for past
human rights abuses in order to end impunity.  With testimony from
eyewitnesses, torture survivors and former members of Battalion 316, and the
exhumation of clandestine burial sites, evidence is accumulating which can
be used to identify and charge rights violators.

	Key to this effort is an on-going, multifaceted investigation of forced
disappearances which was launched by Dr. Leo Valladares Lanza in 1992,
immediately upon his appointment as Honduras' first National Commissioner
for Human Rights ("Ombudsman").  Honduran law specifically charges the Human
Rights Commissioner with the investigation of violations committed by
Honduran authorities, including the military and police.  The law further 
stipulates that the investigations undertaken are independent of the
executive, legislative and judicial branches of government.  Honduran
government officials and entities must give the Human Rights Commissioner
information requested in the course of an investigation.  Since the
Commissioner does not have prosecutorial power, in cases where there is
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, findings are passed along to Honduras'
Attorney General, who in turn 
brings formal charges against alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses.

	In December 1993, Human Rights Commissioner Valladares released a detailed
"preliminary" report on the findings of his investigation.  The report,
entitled The Facts Speak for Themselves, documented the role of the Honduran
Armed Forces -- and particularly Battalion 316 -- in 184 disappearances
during the 1980s.  It represented 
the first official acknowledgment by the Honduran government of military
participation in the disappearance of its own citizens.

DECLASSIFICATION REQUESTS

	From the very beginning of his investigation, Valladares' efforts to
recover relevant Honduran documents related to cases of disappearance bore
little fruit.  Like most other Latin American nations, Honduras has no clear
laws to preserve State archives.  Neither is there an established legal
process for public disclosure of Honduran government records.  Valladares
quickly discovered that key Honduran files were missing or had been
destroyed.  For example, during an on-site inspection at the offices of
Honduran military intelligence, human rights investigators found only empty
file cabinets and were told that files are routinely burned every five years
in order to free up additional storage space.

	In light of this situation, Valladares turned to the United States, which
has the most sophisticated archival and freedom of information system in the
world, to uncover historical documentation regarding human rights violations
in Honduras.  Given the close collaboration between the U.S. government and
the Honduran military during the 1980s, Valladares reasonably assumed that
U.S. files contain human rights information critical to his investigation.

	On November 15, 1993, Valladares presented his first formal
declassification request to the U.S. government.  The U.S. Administration
expressed a willingness to cooperate and to provide assistance, but
indicated that the request was too broad in scope.1 Twice Valladares
narrowed his response, submitting an abridged final version to the U.S.
Ambassador in Honduras on August 1, 1995.2

	Battalion 316 is one of only three subject areas included in the final
declassification request from the Honduran Human Rights Commissioner.  The
request intentionally targets information on Battalion 316 relevant to the
investigation of disappearances.  It reads, in part:

We are requesting finished intelligence, reports, studies, notes, papers,
cables, memoranda, briefing papers, talking points, meeting minutes,
biographical material and any and all other documents generated by the
United States Government agencies between 1979 through and including 1984,
about the Battalion 316, a unit of Military Intelligence established to
monitor and destroy 'subversive' organizations and individuals in Honduras.3

	The petition requests "any and all records" related to Battalion 316 in
three specific areas.  The first focuses on "the origins, structure,
planning operations, training, and members" of Battalion 316 and its
institutional precursors.  The second seeks "records which mention the
Battalion 316 and/or its predecessors" in reference to six cases of 
disappearance.  The third pursues records on nineteen "individuals who were
members of the Battalion 316, of its 
precursors, or of other special anti-subversive units of the Armed Forces or
of the police."4

	Seven U.S. government agencies were asked to provide information on
Battalion 316.  They are: the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the U.S.
Army, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Department of State (DOS).5

	Almost five years have passed since the United States received the initial
Honduran Human Rights Commissioner's request for human rights information.
Despite repeated assurances that the request would be expedited, the U.S.
government's response has been excruciatingly slow.6

	The CIA has yet to release records on Battalion 316 to the Honduran
government.  The delay is particularly aggravating given the fact that the
agency's Inspector General (IG) issued a classified report on the CIA's
relationship to the Honduran military on August 27, 1997.  The report was
submitted to the House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees, but Honduran investigators are not privy to its contents.  

	It is noteworthy that upon review of its contents, on October 29, 1997, the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI) sent a letter to Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet
asking that the CIA IG report be declassified to the maximum extent
possible.  The letter further requests that DCI Tenet report back to the
Committee within four week on his intentions regarding the declassification
of the IG report as well as to his response to the recommendations in the
report.7  The SSCI leaders have not yet received a response from Tenet.

	The information declassified by other U.S. agencies on Battalion 316 has
been scant and inadequate. This is particularly true in the case of the
Defense Department which claims to have processed and turned over all its
records which are responsive to the Honduran request.  The DOD has released
a total of 49 documents to the Honduran 
authorities; thirteen of these mention Battalion 316.  The Battalion
316-related documents are either heavily redacted, or are transcriptions
which expurgate everything but the text which was released. 8

	The bulk of the U.S. information related to Battalion 316 which the
Honduran authorities have received was previously declassified in response
to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request from The Baltimore Sun.  The 26
May 1994 request included:

Any and all information related to the origin, structure, members and
functions of Battalion 316; and all information relating to assistance and
training provided by the United States government and others to members of
Battalion 316, and any all (sic) information relating to possible human
rights violations committed by members of Battalion 316.9

	After the FOI request languished for almost a year without a response, The
Sun grew impatient.  It hired a prominent law firm and threatened to sue the
CIA to obtain documents.  The very next day a packet of fourteen
declassified documents was delivered to the newspaper's offices.10
	Most of the information obtained by The Sun involves the testimony of
Florencio Caballero Bonilla.  Caballero, a former Honduran Army Sergeant,
claimed to have been a member of Battalion 316 who had received training in
interrogation techniques from the CIA.  He deserted from the Honduran
military intelligence apparatus in June, 1986 and later shared eyewitness
testimony in a number of different fora, some public and some confidential.
Since Caballero's testimony first became public, the U.S. has downplayed it
and has questioned its accuracy.

	Honduran investigators used the content of the declassified U.S. documents
to help formulate questions which were posed to Caballero in Toronto, Canada
in November, 1996.  The sworn deposition taken there was the last testimony
given by Caballero prior to his death in July, 1997.  This testimony will
remain sealed until introduced as evidence in Honduran court.

BATTALION 316'S EXISTENCE AND STRUCTURE

	A U.S. Defense Department paper on "Honduran Intelligence Organization (U)"
indicates that the 316th Military Intelligence Battalion (MIB) was formed in
January 1983 as part of the restructuring of the intelligence system.  
It reports that:

The MIB, in support of national intelligence requirements, has established
covert operational sites in major cities and is working closely with DNI
[National Directorate of Investigations] and its network of agents and
informants.  In addition, the MIB works closely with the Signal Battalion
and the PSYOPS GP [Psychological Operations Group], while providing direct
support to the Special Forces Battalion and FUSEP's elite counterterrorist
unit, the Special 
Squadron or Cobras.11

	Battalion 316's organization into four companies -- Support, Military
Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Internal Security, and a Special
Operations Squadron (Support) -- is described in some detail.  The paper
notes that:

The Counterintelligence (CI) Company is the most developed part of the MIB
and apparently enjoys the highest priority.  The CI Company is not large,
probably less than 50 members.  The majority of the personnel working in or
with the CI Company are DNI agents, [excised].  The primary mission of the
CI Company is to develop intelligence, through covert means, concerning
subversive and antigovernment groups, factions, or individuals who might
pose a threat.12

Honduran human rights investigators have focused their attention on the CI
Company.

	The January 1983 date for the establishment of Battalion 316 which appears
in the DOD paper is inaccurate.  The Human Rights Commissioner has obtained
a copy of National Defense and Public Security Ministry Accords 0112 and
0113 in which the Armed Forces Commander Gustavo Alvarez Martinez ordered
the creation of Intelligence Battalion 316, and assigned personnel to staff
it.13  Both Accords are dated January 2, 1984.       

	Regarding the disbanding of Battalion 316, one sentence of an unidentified
DOD document was released which reads, "Press reports of January 1988
indicate that the 316th Battalion was deactivated in September 1987 to quell
speculation following allegations of death squad activities made against the
battalion."14 This is consistent with the testimony given by Colonel Roberto
Nunez chief of Honduran military intelligence, before the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in 1998. 

316 AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

	What do declassified U.S. documents say about Battalion 316's
responsibility for human rights abuses?

	In response to the requests for the declassification of human rights
information, the CIA formed an internal "Honduras Working Group."  The
public had its first glimpse of the Group's findings in August 1997 when the
CIA released seven pages of its redacted 37 page report.  Though the date of
the report is excised, the text reveals that it was written sometime after
May 1997.  One can therefore assume that the report represents a relatively
current assessment by the CIA of the information retrieved from its files.

	The released portions of the report contain disappointingly little human
rights information about Battalion 316.  In fact, the Working Group
concluded that:
 
... there is little information in the files to corroborate press reports
that the 316th Battalion was a death squad or was involved in many abuses.
Information in the files implicates the 316th Battalion in only one case --
that of the disappearance of leftists Morales and Vindel in 1984.15

Gustavo Morales and Rolando Vindel are identified as "two senior Honduran
Communist Party members" who were abducted on 18 March 1984.  Honduran
authorities denied having the men in custody, "but [excised] had reporting
to the contrary."16

	The report reveals that the CIA received fairly detailed information on
this case from its sources.  One section includes disturbing accounts that:

"...the 316th Battalion was holding Morales and Vindel as late as 15 April",
at least a month after they were originally captured;

"... Vindel was seriously wounded, his leg broken by gunshot as he tried to
flee during the abduction"; and

"...[excised] had withheld food from the two men for at least the first
eight days of their captivity."17

	The report's authors exercise care in the attribution of organizational
responsibility in this case.  A footnote of the report clarifies that even
though CIA sources referred to Morales and Vindel's abductors as members of
a Special Unit of the Public Security Forces (Fuerzas de Seguridad Publica -
FUSEP):

Our review, however, indicates that by January 1984 the FUSEP Special Unit
had been incorporated into the 316th Battalion.  It seems clear that
[excised] continued to call the group by its former rather than its new
name.  This review, however, has used the title 316th Battalion where
appropriate to depict organizational responsibility accurately.18

ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BLURRED 

	By focusing on 'organizational responsibility', the CIA Honduras Working
Group report exonerates Battalion 316 in all but one case of forced
disappearance.  Instead, it attributes responsibility for human rights
abuses to the FUSEP Special Unit and to a rightist paramilitary organization
called the Honduran Anti-Communist Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion
Anti-Comunista de Honduras - ELACH).  The report goes on to suggest a link
between the FUSEP Special 
Unit and ELACH, citing three specific cases:

The source reported that ELACH victims included, among others, Nativi
Martinez, and Angel Manfredo Velazquez ... Information [excised] in 1981
indicated that the FUSEP's Special Unit was involved in the killings of
Nativi, Martinez, 
and Velazquez.19

	ELACH was never identified as a group in Honduras in the 1980s.  Honduran
investigators are puzzled by the CIA findings regarding its role in abuse.
Indeed, the first mention investigators heard of ELACH occurred in a Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) document which was declassified for
The Baltimore Sun in early 1995.  This secret 1986 trip report by SSCI staff
states:

In a recent letter to the SSCI, the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence]
described human rights abuses in Honduras.  Mr. Casey outlined the
activities of the National Directorate of Investigations (DNI) and its
relationship to ELACH, a right-wing death squad.  Between 1980-84, the
'symbiotic relationship' between DNI and ELACH resulted in the execution of
at least nine persons who were Honduran leftists.  Each of these executions
was personally approved by the Armed Forces Commander and by the President.
[excised]  Finally, in his letter, the DCI expressed concern that ELACH
continues to be a viable organization and has high level contacts in the
government.20

	Some of the content of Casey's letter may have been drawn from a secret CIA
cable dated 26 November 1985 which reads:  

BETWEEN 1980, WHEN THE HONDURAN ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION ARMY ELACH WAS
FOUNDED, AND 1984, WHEN ELACH KIDNAPPINGS AND EXECUTIONS WERE ENDED, AT
LEAST NINE HONDURAN LEFTISTS WERE KIDNAPPED AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXECUTED BY
ELACH AT THE ORDER OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF
INVESTIGATIONS (DNI).  WHEN ELACH CONDUCTED A KIDNAPPING AND KILLING, ITS
ACTION WAS COORDINATED WITH DNI, AND OCCASIONALLY PERSONNEL FROM ELACH AND
THE DNI WORKED JOINTLY IN SUCH OPERATIONS.21

	It is notable that this cable includes Tomas Nativi, Fidel Martinez and
Angel Manfredo Velasquez on the list 
of the nine individuals kidnapped and killed by ELACH, presumably in
coordination with the DNI.  In contrast to the 
Honduras Working Group report, this cable makes no reference to the FUSEP
Special Unit's involvement in these 
three cases.  

	There is clearly confusion about organizational responsibility.  This may
be due in part to the fact that at the time DNI, like the Special Unit, was
under FUSEP command.  A declassified DOD paper indicates that, "DNI was
organized to be the criminal investigation branch of FUSEP, but expanded its
operations to cover subversion, 
counterintelligence, and intelligence gathering ."22

	Given the confusion about which entity within FUSEP bore responsibility for
these three disappearances, the determination of individual responsibility
becomes paramount to Honduran investigators.  Release of U.S. information on
individual perpetrators of abuses could be extremely helpful in situations
like this.  

	The issue of organizational responsibility is further complicated by
references to the connection between Battalion 316 and ELACH.  The SSCI trip
report notes that:

The 316 MIB reports directly to the Chief of Honduran Intelligence and the
Commander of the Armed Forces.  The battalion continues to conduct
surveillance operations against Honduran leftists. [excised] could not
guarantee that there was no hand-over of information from the battalion to
ELACH because of the high level contacts ELACH maintains with members of the
Honduran Armed Forces.23

	Thus, instead of clarifying the issue of organizational responsibility, the
declassified documents raise further questions.  Different documents suggest
connections between ELACH and the FUSEP Special Unit, ELACH and the DNI, and
ELACH and Battalion 316.  Exactly what was the relationship between these
bodies?  What was the time period during which ELACH was operative?

	The information from U.S. files indicates that three groups -- FUSEP
Special Unit, DNI and Battalion 316 -- under the command of the Honduran
Armed Forces coordinated closely with each other and with the paramilitary
ELACH.  Was this by design?  Blurred lines of organizational responsibility
may give the Honduran Armed Forces plausible deniability for human rights
abuses.  

	Given this dynamic, it is important that the Honduran declassification
requests be interpreted as broadly as possible by the U.S. government.  If,
while processing the pending request for information on Battalion 316, U.S. 
agency officials stumble upon substantive information on human rights abuses
by other military or paramilitary groups or specific individuals, this too
should be processed for possible release, even if the group or individual is
not 
specifically mentioned in the request.  Declassification of human rights
information is not an academic exercise, but rather an opportunity to assist
investigators who seek to identify and prosecute violators in order to stop
impunity and to strengthen democracy in Honduras.

INFORMATION ON ELACH SOUGHT

	Clearly, additional information on ELACH is of critical importance to human
rights investigators in Honduras.  Since first reading the reference to
ELACH in the SSCI trip report, the Honduran Human Rights Commissioner and 
others have sought to learn more.  Indeed, his final, narrow
declassification request to the U.S. government specifically listed key
documents related to Battalion 316, among them:

A copy of the 1986 letter written by CIA Director William Casey to the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence describing human rights in Honduras,
and discussing connections between the National Directorate of
Investigations (DNI) and 'ELACH', a right-wing death squad.24  

This letter has not yet been declassified.

	Freedom of Information Act requests have also been submitted to the CIA,
the Defense Department and to U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) for any and
all records concerning ELACH from 1979 to the present.  Only SOUTHCOM has
responded to date, indicating that it was "unsuccessful in locating any
information responsive to your request."25

	There is no mention of ELACH in any of the human rights records which the
U.S. Defense Department (DOD) has released to Honduran authorities.  This is
illogical and would appear to contradict the CIA Working Group's Findings.

	Battalion 316, the FUSEP Special Unit and the DNI were all under Honduran
military command during the time period that the most serious human rights
abuses occurred.  This was also a period when the U.S. military worked
closely with the Honduran Armed Forces on counter-insurgency and
anti-subversive programs.  Most of the victims of human rights abuses were
suspected subversives. Given this historical context and in light of SOUTHCOM's 
particular responsibility to monitor and report on military activities in
Honduras, why is there no information on ELACH in its files?  

CONCLUSIONS

	Honduras is a country in transition from years of military rule to a strong
democratic state.  It is a country scarred by the emotional wounds of
egregious human rights violations committed by military and paramilitary
groups during the 1980s.  Healing and reconciliation will not occur without
a full airing of this dark history, much of which remains shrouded in secrecy.

	The right to information is a fundamental human right and a pillar of
democracy, both in Honduras and in the United States.  The right to
information is not only a major safeguard against military and other
official impunity, but a fundamental necessity in a society that has
experienced the type of violence and turmoil that befell Honduras in the 1980s.

	The search for the truth about groups like Battalion 316 that achieved
notoriety for human rights abuses is a protracted and painful process.  It
is necessary, nonetheless, to break the cycle of impunity, to reestablish the 
citizenry's trust in the institution of the Honduran state and to foster the
moral and political health of the nation.  

	The United States can contribute to this process by making a sincere,
concerted effort to locate and expedite public disclosure of human rights
records on Honduras to the fullest extent possible.  Such a declassification 
of records would send a convincing message that the United States will not
tolerate military impunity, and stands clearly and unequivocally for
democracy and human rights in Honduras.

FOOTNOTES

1 An English translation of the 8 December 1993 letter from then U.S.
Ambassador William T. Pryce, in response to the Valladares request, is found
on page 255 of The Facts Speak for Themselves, published by Human Rights
Watch/Americas and the Center for Justice and International Law in July 1994.

2 Valladares' second declassification request, dated December 21, 1993,
included three general points related to Battalion 316 as well as a list of
29 U.S. officials to be queried about their knowledge of "the practice of
kidnapping, torture, disappearances and executions of Honduran and
Nicaraguan citizens by the Battalion 316."  An English translation of this
request can be found on pages 242-247 of The Facts Speak for Themselves,
published by Human Rights Watch/Americas and the Center for Justice and
International Law in July 1994.  

The Special Prosecutor for Human Rights of the Honduran Public Ministry,
Sonia Marlyna de Flores, submitted a separate declassification request to
the U.S. government on June 15, 1995.  Battalion 316 is one of the five
topics included in the Flores request.  An English translation of the Flores
request is found on pages 84-87 of In Search of Hidden Truths, published by
the National Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras in January 1998.

3 In Search of Hidden Truths, by Leo Valladares Lanza and Susan C. Peacock,
National Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras, January 1998, p. 96.

4 Ibid, p. 97.

5 An English translation of the final Valladares request, including the
specifics addressed to each of the agencies, is found on pages 91-103 of In
Search of Hidden Truths, published by the National Commissioner for Human
Rights in Honduras in January 1998.

6 A 13 June 1997 letter from President Clinton to each of the 51 Members of
the U.S. Congress who had written him 
about the Honduras declassification stated that, "CIA expects to release any
human rights-related material on 
General Alvarez by early September and on Battalion 316 by late November."  

A 1 December 1997 letter from President Bill Clinton to Morton Halperin,
Chair, Advisory Board, Center for National Security Studies, indicated that
the "CIA will release human rights-related material on General Alvarez in
the next few weeks and on Battalion 316 by year's end.  The latter will
include the Inspector General's report."

On 11 May 1998, in sworn testimony before the Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information and Technology of the Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight of the U.S. House of Representatives, Mr. Lee S. Strickland,
Chief, Information Review Group, Central Intelligence Agency, projected the
release of documents on Battalion 316 and portions of the CIA IG report "in
several weeks."

7 Though the SSCI letter itself is partially classified, reference is made
to it in a letter which Senator Carl Levin sent to his constituent, Virginia
Smith, on October 30, 1997.

8 On January 30, 1998 the US Defense Department (DOD) turned over fifteen
documents.  Instead of making them available in their original redacted
format, DOD transcribed only the text released on plain, white paper, giving
no indication of its origin or the date on which the material was officially
declassified.

9  In Search of Hidden Truths, by Leo Valladares Lanza and Susan C. Peacock,
National Commissioner for Human Rights in Honduras, January 1998, p. 16. 

10 The Sun incorporated this newly declassified information in its
prize-winning, four-part series of reports on U.S. knowledge of, and
complicity in, human rights violations in Honduras which was published in
June 1995.

11 "Honduran Intelligence Organization (U)", date excised, DOD
Declassification (3/97), Document 4, p. 2.

12 Ibid, p. 4.

13 Los Hechos Hablan Por Si Mismos, Comisionado Nacional de Proteccion de
los Derechos Humanos, Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras, January
1994, pp. 467-469.

14 "Battalion 36 Reported Deactivated in September 1987", DOD
Declassification (1/98).

15 Review and Findings of the Honduras Working Group, date excised, CIA
Honduras Declassification (8/97), Document H2-94, page 9.

16 Ibid, page 9.

17 Ibid, page 35.

18 Ibid, page 35.

19 Ibid, pp. 9-10.

20 "Trip to Honduras", 18 March 1986, Secret Memorandum, The Baltimore Sun
Declassification, pp. 6-7.

21 "1. HONDURAN LEFTISTS EXECUTED BY THE HONDURAN ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION
ARMY BETWEEN 1980-1984; 2. HONDURAN LEFTISTS PLACED UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY
"ELACH" IN 1985", 26 November 1985, CIA Declassification (8/97), Document
H2-20, p. 2.

22 "Honduran Intelligence Organization (U)", date excised, DOD
Declassification (3/97), Document 4, p. 4.

23 "Trip to Honduras", 18 March 1986, Secret Memorandum, The Baltimore Sun
Declassification, p. 7.

24 Request for Documents Made by the National Commissioner for Human Rights
in Honduras to the Government of the United States, original Spanish
version, July 31, 1995, page 6.

25 Letter from Lt. A. A. Hipolito to author, U.S. Southern Command, FOIA REF
#98-085, 10 August 1998, one page.

--- End Message ---